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JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §
78A-3-102(3)G) and (4).
STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Issue #1

Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, concluding this
action was barred by Goldenwest's failure to timely commence this action under
UTAH

CODE ANN.§ 78B-2-307.
Standard of Review
"An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant

or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. We
review matters of statutory construction for correctness." Salt Lake City Corp. v.
Haik, 334 P.3d 490, 494 2014 UT App 193,, 8.
Issue #2

Whether a genuine issue of material facts exists concerning whether the
agreement for Ms. Kenworthy to pay $200 per month was a separate oral agreement
or modification of the written contact between Ms. Kenworthy and Goldenwest.
Standard of Review

"The issue of whether a contract exists may present both questions of law and
fact, depending on the nature of the claims raised. Thus, our standard of review for
Page 11
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this issue turns on whether the claim is one of fact or law, because a ruling on whether
a contract exists may embody several subsidiary rulings. The trial court first finds the
facts to which the law will be applied, and then it applies the law to those facts to
reach a conclusion oflaw." Cal Wadsworth Const. v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d
1373, 1375 (Utah App. 1993).
Issue #3

Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to Ms. Kenworthy, as
the prevailing party under the contract.
Standard of Review

"Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which
we review for correctness .... the determination of which party prevailed in a civil
action--and thus may be entitled to attorney fees--is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion." Federated Capital Corp. v. Haner, 351 P.3d 816, 819, 2015 UT App. 132,

STATUTES, RULES & REGULATIONS

U.R.C.P. 78B-2-113. Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to pay.
( 1)
An action for recovery of a debt may be brought within the applicable statute
of limitations from the date:
(a)
the debt arose;
(b)
a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is made by
the debtor; or
(c)
a payment is made on the debt by the debtor.
U.R.C.P. 78B-2-307. Within four years.
An action may be brought within four years:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(I) after the last charge is made or the last payment is received:
(a) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in
writino·
o,
(b) on an open store account for any goods, wares, or merchandise; or
(c) on an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials
furnished;
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of Title 25,
Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act:
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a), which in specific situations limits the time for
action to one year, under Section 25-6-1 O;
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); and
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law.
U.R.C.P. 78B-2-309. Within six years -- Mesne profits of real property -- Instrument
in writing.
An action may be brought within six years:
for the mesne profits of real property;
( 1)
(2)
upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in
writing, except those mentioned in Section 78B-2-311; and
(3)
to recover fire suppression costs or other damages caused by wildland fire.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1.

On May 13, 2014, Plaintiff, Goldenwest Federal Credit Union

C'Goldenwest"), commenced this action by serving default Defendant, Kathleen
Kenworthy ("Ms. Kenworthy"), with a 10-day Summons and Complaint, then filing
the Complaint on May 15, 2014. [R. 168 Finding of Pact #10]
2.

On December 22, 2014, the court entered a Ruling and Order granting

Ms. Kenworthy's Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Ruling"). [R. 168]
3.

On February 24, 2015, Ms. Kenworthy moved for an award of attorney
Page 13
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fees, pursuant to the terms of her written agreement with Goldenwest. [R. 175-202]
4.

On April 14, 2015, after Goldenwest, represented by prior counsel,

failed to object to Ms. Kenworthy's Motion for Attorney Fees, the court entered an
order awarding fees to Ms. Kenworthy. [R. 210-213]
5.

Goldenwest filed its Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2015. [R. 214-217]

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The decision of the trial court was based on the following undisputed facts
which are relevant to this appeal:
1.

Goldenwest and Ms. Kenworthy entered into a loan agreement (the

"Original Agreement") on April 24, 2006. [R. 167]
2.

On May 9, 2008, the Parties orally agreed to Ms. Kenworthy's

repayment of debt in the amount of $200 per month. [R. 168]
3.

On May 9, 2008, Ms. Kenworthy paid Goldenwest $200. [R. 168]

4.

Ms. Kenworthy made no payments to Goldenwest after May 9, 2008.

[R. 168]
5.

The alleged debt at issue in the Complaint arose before May 12, 2008.

[R. 168]
6.

Goldenwest served Ms. Kenworthy with a Complaint for the present

case on May 13, 2014, and filed the Complaint with this Court on May 15, 2014. [R.
168]

7.

Ms. Kenworthy made the $200 payment by credit card and a copy of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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credit card receipt was submitted without objection as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of
Shanna Hmvell, filed with Goldenwest's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment. [R. 84-87, Affidavit 15]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
After defaulting on her vehicle loan, Ms. Kenworthy orally agreed to modify
her monthly payments from $487 .21 per month, due by the 15 th day of each month; to
$200 per month, also due on or before the 15 th day of the month. Ms. Kenworthy
made the first modified payment on May 9, 2008. When Ms. Kenworthy failed to
make her next scheduled payment on June 15, 2008, she breached the Contract and
the cause of action accrued on June 16, 2008. Since Ms. Kenworthy's loan was
formalized in a written agreement, Goldenwest had until June 16, 2014, to commence
an action to enforce the Loan Agreement. By filing its lawsuit on May 13, 2014,
Goldenwest timely commenced this action and the trial court's conclusion that the
Complaint was untimely should be reversed.
Since the award of attorney fees is based upon a written agreement, if this
Court reverses the trial court's ruling that the Complaint was untimely, the award of
attorney fees to Kenworthy must also be reversed.

ARGUMENT
A.

THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DID NOT RUN BEFORE THIS
ACTION WAS COMMENCED.
On April 24, 2006, the parties entered into the Original Agreement to finance
Page 15
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the purchase of a vehicle. The Original Agreement required Ms. Kenworthy to repay
the loan in installments of $487 .21 per month by the 15 th day of the month. Payments
were made until February 15, 2008. On May 9, 2008, Ms. Kenworthy contacted
Goldenwest to discuss her financial problems and inability to pay the monthly
installments. At that time, the parties orally agreed to reduce Ms. Kenworthy's
monthly payments to $200, with the payments still due by the 15 th day of the month.
In Utah, "Civil actions may be commenced ... after the cause of action has
accrued." UT AH CODE ANN. § 7 8B-2-102. A cause of action for breach of contract
accrues when the contract is breached. Stillwell v. People's Bldg., Loan & Sav.
Ass'n. 57 P. 14, 17 (Utah 1899) ("Before breach of contract no cause of action
accrues.") A cause of action related to a debt does not accrue until a payment is due
and owing, because it is only at that point, that a party may attempt to enforce the
agreement. Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311,313 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (''Ordinarily a
cause of action for a debt begins to run when the debt is due and payable because at
that time an action can be maintained to enforce it." (Internal quotation marks
omitted); Fredericksen v. Knight Land Corp., 667 P.2d 34, 36 (Utah 1983). Utah
appellate courts recognize that breach occurs in installment contracts when the
installment is due. Moab Nat. Bank v. Keystone-Wallace Resources, 517 P.2d 1020,
30 Utah 2d 330 (Utah 1973). The proper application of this principal on similar facts
is found in Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Templeton, 646 S.W.2d 920 (Tenn.App.
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1982).
In Templeton, the Tennessee Court of Appeals was asked to apply its six (6)
year statute of limitations for written contracts to default of payments of an
installment note. In Templeton, three (3) installments were not fully paid, but an
action was not brought until eight (8) years after the first installment was missed. In
concluding the lawsuit was untimely as to the first two installments, the court stated,
"[t]he determinative issue in this case is when did the cause of action accrue." The
court then held:
Furthermore, the cause of action accrues on each installment when it
becomes due and the Statute begins to run from that moment on that
installment. Further, suit may be brought in successive actions upon
each default in an installment for the amount of that defaulted
installment. Whether or not the note contains an acceleration clause,
exercised or not, is of no moment to the defaulted installment. All the
acceleration clause does is accelerate the due date of future installments
to the date of the exercise of the right of acceleration. Therefore, the
cause of action accrued on the 1972 and 1973 installments in December
of each of those years. The accrual of the right of action for each of
those installments occurred more than six years prior to the filing of this
suit.

Id. at 923.
This is consistent with the common law rule that, "[i]n the case of an
obligation payable in installments, the statute of limitations runs against each
installment from the time it becomes due, that is, from the time when an action might
be brought to recover it." 51 Am Jur 2d, Limitation of Actions,§ 133. Moreover,
where an installment contract contains an acceleration clause, the cause of action does
Page 17
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not accrue as to installments, which are not due until those installments are
accelerated. Id.
Here, the trial court appears to have become confused by the effect of the oral
agreement to reduce monthly payments to $200. The trial court's confusion appears
to come from its misinterpretation of UTAH CODE ANN§ 78B-2-113(1), which states:

An action for recovery of a debt may be brought within the applicable
statute of limitations from the date:
(a)
the debt arose;
(b)
a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is
made by the debtor; or
(c)
a payment is made on the debt by the debtor.
On Page 4 of the Ruling [R. 170], the trial court states, "[t]he parties entered
into the Original Agreement on April 24, 2006 and the statute of limitations began
running as of that date under §78B-2-l 13(l)(a), when the 'debt arose'". The trial
court's failure to properly interpret the meaning of the term "debt arose" is the basis
of the trial court's misapplication of the statute of limitations. By saying the "debt"
arose on April 24, 2006 - the date Ms. Kenworthy signed the note, the trial court
equated "debt arose" with "obligation begins." Goldenwest equates the term "debt
arose" with "performance due."
Because of its erroneous interpretation of section §78B-2-113( l)(a), the trial
court misapplied this section by concluding the debt arose under §78B-2-113(1)(a) on
April 24, 2006, and renewed with each monthly payment until February 15, 2008,
when Ms. Kenworthy missed her first payment. [R. 169] The trial court does not
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explain whether it chose to run the statute on February 15, 2008 (the due date of the
first missed payment), or the day after the January 2008 payment. Either way, the
court appears to have concluded the six (6) year limitation period ended no later than
February 15, 2014, and since this action commenced on May 13, 2014, it was late.
Moreover, the court interpreted the term "debt arose" to mean the entire remaining
balance of the loan, and not the amount of an overdue installment. Therefore, the
court effectively accelerated the entire debt in January or February of 2008 and ran
the statute on the full unpaid balance. [R. 169-170]
Goldenwest takes exception with this conclusion because it neglects to
properly analyze that this was an installment agreement and several installments are
within the six (6) year statute of limitations because of the oral agreement modifying
the monthly payment.
1. The modification cured the breach.
When Ms. Kenworthy missed her installment payment on February 15, 2008,
she was in breach as to that payment. She similarly defaulted on her March 15 and
April 15, 2008, payments. Therefore, when she and Goldenwest agreed to reduce her
monthly payment in May 2008 and she paid $200 on May 9, 2008, she was not in
breach of the May payment. However, that was her last payment and she
subsequently missed all other installments. Those installments either came due on the
15 th day of each succeeding month or if/when Goldenwest accelerated the debt.

Page 19
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However, the trial court had no evidence and made no finding that the debt was
accelerated before May 14, 2008 (six years before this action was filed.) Indeed, the
trial court concluded, from the undisputed facts, that Ms. Kenworthy's payments
would be $200 per month until the loan was fully paid. [R. 168, 12] From that
finding, it is clear that the debt was not accelerated and the revised payment
arrangement cured Ms. Kenworthy's prior breach by allowing her to pay the balance
in monthly installments of $200. Thus, until Ms. Kenworthy breached her payment
on June 15, 2008, Goldenwest had no cause of action. Accordingly, the only
remaining question for this Court is the effect, if any, of the oral agreement on the
statute of limitations.
2. The modification did not remove the written agreement from the statute of
limitations for a written contract.
From Goldenwest' s perspective, its agreement to reduce the monthly payment
to $200, together with Ms. Kenworthy's payment of $200 on May 9, 2008; was a
modification of the contract, which cured her prior breach and tolled the statute of
limitations until June 16, 2018, the day after Ms. Kenworthy missed her next
scheduled payment.
In its ruling, the trial court did not decide whether the agreement to pay $200
was a separate oral agreement or a modification of a written agreement because the
court concluded that either way, it was governed by the four (4) year statute of
limitations found in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B -2-307{l)(a). The court stated:
Page I 10
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If [the payment reduction was] a new oral agreement, the renewal
provision would toll a four-year limitations period from May 9, 2008,
when "the debt arose". If the Parties' agreement made an oral
modification of the material terms to the written Original Agreement,
the four-year statute of limitations for oral agreement would begin May
9, 2008.
[R. 170-171].
Generally, determining whether an oral agreement is a modification of a
written agreement or a new contract is a question of fact. Ron Shepherd Ins. v.
Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 65 5 (Utah 1994 ). However, when the facts are undisputed,
questions of fact become questions of law. Coalville City v. Lundgren, 930 P.2d 1206,
1209 (Utah App. 1997) ("Generally, whether a breach is material is a question of fact
to be decided by the jury, unless the facts are undisputed; then it is a question of law
for the court.")
Since the facts surrounding the agreement to reduce the payment are not in
dispute, whether the agreement was a modification to the Original Agreement or
separate oral agreement is a question of law which this Court can decide. Cal
Wadsworth Const. v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah App. 1993).
Thus, Goldenwest assigns error to the conclusion that a narrow oral modification of a
written agreement, which can be proven without resort to parol evidence, is subject to
the four (4) year statute for oral agreements.
3. The agreement to reduce the payment was a modification.

As the moving party who bore the burden of establishing the elements and
Page I 11
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supporting evidence of an issue on which she bore the burden of proof1, Ms.
Kenworthy offered no law or analysis to explain when an oral agreement is a
modification of a separate agreement. While there are Utah cases whish state such a
difference exists 2, there is no case law in Utah explaining the method for making this
determination. Regardless, it is clear from existing Utah precedent that the reduction
of the payment was a modification.
Utah courts have long recognized that oral modifications are enforceable,
particularly where performance has occurred. Bamberger Co. v. Certified
Productions, Inc., 48 P.2d 489, 88 Utah 194 (Utah 1935), R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook,
40 PJd 1119, 2002 UT 11 (Utah 2002). Ms. Kenworthy performed her obligation for
May 2008 by paying $200 on May 9, 2008. Her next payment was then due on June
15, 2008.
In Fisher v. Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1995), this Court stated:

It is settled that the parties to a contract may modify all or any portion of
that contract. Moreover, a condition precedent to enforcement of a
modified contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties,
which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with sufficient
definiteness.
Id. at 1177 (Internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court then held
that the parties had a meeting of the minds and orally modified a written
escrow agreement where they "narrowly modified" a single term of the

1

Orvis v. Johnson. 2008 UT2, 177 P.3d 600, ~ 17.

2

Ron Shepherd Ins .• supra
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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contract-the due date of annual payments; and through their conduct,
observed that modification. Here, Goldenwest and Ms. Kenworthy narrowly
modified the Original Agreement by reducing the amount of the monthly
payment. Their minds met when Ms. Kenworthy paid and Goldenwest
accepted the $200 payment on May 9, 2008.
Fisher further requires that any modification meet the requirements of
the statute of frauds 3 :
The general rule is that any modification of a contract that is within the
statute of frauds must also comply with the statute of frauds. When a
contract is required to be in writing, the same requirement applies with
equal force to any alteration or modification thereof. Under the Utah
Statute of Frauds, the original escrow agreement was required to be in
writing. Thus, at first blush, the oral modification seems to violate the
statute of frauds. However, a recognized and accepted exception to the
statute of frauds provides if a party has changed his position by
performing an oral modification so that it would be inequitable to permit
the other party to found a claim upon the original agreement the
modified agreement should be held valid. Thus, where there is evidence
of part performance under the modified agreement, and where it would
be inequitable to permit a party to repudiate the oral modification and
seek enforcement of the written contract, the oral agreement may be
removed from the statute of frauds and enforced.
Id. at 1176-1177 (Internal quotations and citations omitted). Ms. Kenworthy
fully performed the modified agreement by making her $200 payment on May
9, 2008.

Thereafter, as long as she continued to make her monthly $200

payments, it would have been inequitable for Goldenwest to pursue an action

3 UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-5-4( 1)(a) provides that a contract which by its terms cannot be performed within one
year must be in writing.

Page I 13
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against her for the full amount of any monthly payment - $487 .21.
4. The oral modification did not being the case within the statute of limitations
for an oral agreement.
The trial court relied upon Strand v. Union Pacific Railroad /Co., 6 Utah 2d
279,282, 312; P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1957) for the proposition that oral terms of a
written contract require application of the statute of limitation for oral agreements. [R.
171] In Strand, a contractor and railroad company verbally agreed to materially
change several terms of their construction agreement. These included:
the railroad would make an adjustment including insurance and
expenses so that [the contractor] would not lose a dime; that although
the contract specified July 1, 1944, as the completion date, the railroad
would extend the time to December, 1944, 'by Christmas'; that all costs
and expenses from the beginning to the end of the job would be paid so
that [the contractor] would be reimbursed for his losses; and that the
railroad would pay for capital expenditures and depreciation on
equipment in connection with the job.
Id. at 562.
However, in Strand, all of the evidence of the altered terms was parol, and the
contract was a construction contract, which was not subject to the written
requirements of statute of frauds. Therefore, Strand is inapplicable because: 1) the
terms of the modification here can be proven without resort to parol evidence; and 2)
this contract and oral modification are within the statute of frauds.
Strand is a construction case which adopts a mle from a Texas construction
case, holding that contracts which are partly oral and partly written are governed by
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the statute of limitations for oral agreements. However, Texas courts have recognized
that if the oral portion of the agreement is within the statute of frauds, the contract is
governed by the statute of limitations for written agreements.
In Texas Western Railway Co. v. Gentrv, 1888, 69 Tex. 625, 8 S.W. 98, 101,
the Texas Supreme Court concluded the resolution of a board of directors signed by
the officers, "is a memorandum in writing as required by the statute of frauds, and that
as such, it can be lawfully enforced." Id. Further,
[i]f a resolution duly entered and signed can be a writing under the
statutes of frauds, it must be a contract in writing within the meaning of
the statute of limitations, where it shows upon its face that it is intended
as the final acceptance of a previous agreement.
Id. Therefore, where an agreement is governed by the statute of frauds and the
evidence of the terms of the agreement are sufficient to meet the requirement of the
statute of frauds, the written nature of the agreement is established and the oral nature
of any evidence is not determinative of the treatment of the contract, for purposes of
the statute of limitations.
Here, the final expression of the agreement reducing payments to $200 is the
receipt for Ms. Kenworthy's credit card payment, reflecting her agreement to pay the
reduced amount. More importantly, all of the terms can be ascertained by reference to
written documents: 1) the amount of original obligation and interest rate are in
writing; 2) the amount of the reduced payment is reflected in the written receipt; and
3) the adjusted repayment term can be ascertained though calculation, using the
Page I 15
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outstanding balance; interest rate; and the new installment amount. There are no
modified terms which must be proven by parol. Accordingly, rather than applying the
four (4) year statute for oral agreements, the correct application of Strand is to keep
this case within the six (6) year statute for written contracts. This is true because:
a written promise to pay without naming the amount may be construed
as founded on a written instrument where an objective standard for
determining the price is provided in the instrument, even though the
amount must be ascertained by evidence [from elsewhere].
Id. at 563.
B.

ATTORNEY FEES

On February 24, 2015, Ms. Kenworthy filed a motion for an award of attorney
fees, as the prevailing party under the reciprocal fee provision in UTAH CODE ANN.§
78B-5-826. Under prior counsel, Goldenwest did not object to that motion. The court
awarded fees pursuant in its Order entered on April 14, 2015. Since Goldenwest did
not object to the entry of fees before the trial court, it did not preserve the ability to
challenge the amount of fees on appeal. However, the award of fees was based on
Ms. Kenworthy being the prevailing party under the reciprocal fee provision in UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78B-5-826. If this Court reverses the decision of the trial court, Ms.
Kenworthy will no longer be a prevailing party and there will be no legal basis for her
to receive fees. For that reason, Goldenwest requests that the award of attorney fees
be reversed. Watkins v. Ford, 239 P.3d 526, 2010 UT App 243 (Utah App. 2010)
(Reversing reciprocal award of fees and awarding fees under contact for trial and
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appeal.) Goldenwest further requests that the issue of expenses, including attorney
fees for this appeal, be evaluated by the trial court when a final order is entered.
General Const.·& Development. Inc. v. Peterson Plumbin2 Supplv, 248 P.3d 972,
974, 2011 UT 1, ~ 13.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Goldenwest asks this Court to reverse the trial
court's grant of summary judgment and conclude the statute of limitations for written
agreements, pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78B-3-309, governs the time for filing
this action; that the reduction of the payment amount is a medication to the Original
Agreement; and reverse the award of attorney fees to Ms. Kenworthy.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of January, 2016.
SMITH;KNOWLES, P.C.

~ .)auJ,/·

£

·--Dana T. Farmer
Attorney for Appellant
Goldenwest Federal Credit Union
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ADDENDUM#l
(Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment)
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FILED DJS
Third Ju/~ICT COURT
ic1a/ District

DEC 22 20/i
By

SALT~KE

couNry

IN THE TI-IlRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STAIB OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

GOLDENWEST FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION,

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff;

Case No. 149905786

V.

Judge Eli2abeth Hruby-Mills

KATHLEEN F. K.ENWORTIIY,

DAIB: December 22, 2014

Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 8,
2014. PJaintiff filed an Opposition to the Motion dated August 22, 2014, and Defendant filed a Reply

Memorandllllldated August 29, 2014. Comtheld oral argument on this Motion on November 7,
2014. Plaintiff seeks damages against Defendant for an alleged breach of contract Defendant requests

entry of summary judgment based on the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The Comt
grants Defendant's Motion for Sumnary Judgment and enters the following order.

FlNDINGS OF FACT

1. PlaintiffGoldenwest Federal Credit Union and Defendant Kathleen Kenworthy (collectively
"Parties") entered into a loan agreement ('Original Agreement') on April 24, 2006. Cornp1aint

15; Answer.
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2. On May 9, 2008, the Parties orally agreed to Defendant's repayment of debt in the amotmt of
$200 per month. Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
("Opposition"), Statement of Additional Facts 13; Reply Memorandtnn in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Swmiary Judgment on Plaintiff's Claims ("Reply"), Argument Section
Ill.

3. On May 9, 2008, Defendant paid Plaintiff$200. Opposition, Statement of Additional Facts,
4.
4. Defendant made no payments to Plaintiff after May 9, 2008. Memorandum in Support of

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Claims ("Motion"), ,r 3; Opposition, ,r

3.
5. The alleged debt at issue in the Complaint arose before May 12, 2008. Complaint ,r 3.
6. On March 2, ·2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant ("Previous Case').

Goldenwest Federal Credit Union v. Kathleen Kenworthy, case no. 110905153 DC (Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah) (2011 ).

7. On March 25, 2011, in the Previous Case, Defendant filed an Answer and Cowiterclaim
("2011 Counterclaim') against Plaintiff: Id.
8. In the 2011 Counterclaim, Defendant denied any default of the Original Agreement and denied
owing a debt to Plaintiff: Id.
9. Toe Court dismissed the Previous Case on January 11, 2012 for lack of prosecution Id.
10. Plaintiff served Defendant with a Complaint for the present case on May 13, 2014 and filed the
Complaint with this Court on May 15, 2014.

2
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary Judgment is appropriate only when there is ''no genuine issue as to any material fact

and ... the nx>ving party is entitled to judgrrent as a matter of law." URCP 56(c). On a motion for

summary judgmmt, the court views the facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most
v;)

favorable to the nonmovingparty. Morra v. Grand County, 2010 UT 21, ,r 12,230 P.3d 1022, 1026
(Utah 2010).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Defendant moves for summary judgment claiming that Plaintiff's claim is barred by the running of
the statute of limitations covering the agreement between the Parties. An action may be brought within
six years ''upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instnnnent in writing." Utah Code

Ann. (1953) § 78B-2-309. The Parties entered into a written loan agreement, the Original Agreement,
on April 24, 2006 initially tolling P1aintiff s limitation to bring a cause of action on that imtnnnent The
statute of limitations for recovery of a debt may nonetheless be started or revived ''from the date: (a) the
debt arose; (b) a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay is made by the debtor; or (c)
a payment is made on the debt by the debtor." Utah Code Ann (1953) § 78B-2-113(1). Ifan action
is barred by provision of the statute of limitations, "it shall be unavailable ... as a caU5e of action" Utah

Code Ann (1953) § 78B-2-113(2). The actions of the Parties in this case did renew a limitations
period, but not after May 12, 2008. Because PJaintiffserved and filed the Complaint after May 12,

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2014 and the statute of limitations had run, Plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations and has no
present cause of action against Defendant.
1.

The six year statute of limitations has run in this case and the Parties' actions did
not renew the tolling under§ 78B-2-113(l)(a) or (l)(c).
The Parties' entered into the Original Agreement on April 24, 2006 and the statute of limitations

began nnming as of that date llllder § 78B-2- l 13(1)(a), when the "debt arose." Utah Code Ann.
(1953) § 78B-2- l 13. As a result of§ 78B-2-113(l)(c), which renews the limitations period upon
payment on the debt, the statute of limitations restarted on each successive payment made by
Defendant. Plaintiff alleges that on February 15, 2008, Defendant failed to make the monthly payment
on the Original Agreement, ending the renewal of the statute of limitations for payment on the debt.
Even if Defendant's payment of$200 to Plaintiff on May 9, 2008 constituted payment on the debt
llllder the Original Agreement, the six-year statute of limitations had nm before Plaintiff served the
Complaint in this case.

2.

The Parties' actions did not renew the statute of limitations by written
acknomedgement of the debt or promise to pay under§ 78B-2-113(l)(b).
The limitations period for bringing a cause of action on a written instrument can be renewed by

"a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay ... by the debtor." Utah Code Ann (1953)
§ 78B-2-113(l)(b). Either a written acknowledginent or a promise to pay is sufficient to renew the

limitation period tmder this provision and both are not required. Beck v. Dutchman Coal. Mines Co.,
2 Utah2d 104, 108,269 P.2d 867, 869 (Utah 1954).
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On May 9, 2008, the parties agreed orally that Defendant would pay $200 per month toward
the debt owed to Plaintiff on the Original Agreeirent and Defendant tendered $200 the same day.
Whether this was a wholly new oral agreement as Defendant suggests or a modification to the Original
Agreement as the Plaintiffsuggests, the result is the same. If a new oral agreement, the renewal
provision would toll a four-year limitations period from May 9, 2008, when "the debt arose." Utah
Code Am (1953) § 78B-2-l 13(l)(a); Utah Code Ann (1953) § 78B-2-307(l)(a) ("An action may
be brought within four years after the last charge is made or the last payment received upon a contract,
obligation, or liability not fotmded upon an ins~nt in writing'). If the Parties' agreeirent made an
oral modification of material tenm to the written Original Agreement, the four-year statute of limitations
for oral agreements would begin May 9, 2008. Strand v. Union Pc. R. Co., 6 Utah 2d 279,282,312
P.2d 561, 563 (Utah 1957) ('where a specific material tenn of the contract in writing is subsequently
changed orally, the statute of limitations applicable to oral contracts applies'l In either case, the statute
of limitations had nm before Plaintiff initiated this case and Plaintiff has no cause of action against
Defendant. Even if the Court were to apply a six-year statute of limitations, that period to11s on May 9,
2008, ''from the date ... a promise to pay is made by the debtor." Utah Code Ann. (1953) §
78B-2-l 13(l)(b).
Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that Defendant aclmowledged the debt in a March 25, 2011
1

Answer and Counterclaim in a separate case between the parties on the same issues. Interpreting
'acknowledgement of the debt', the Supreme Court of Utah explained that:
No set phrase or particular form of1anguage is required; anything that will indicate that the party
making the acknowledgment admits that he is still liable on the claim, that he is still bound for its

Goldenwest Federal Credit Union v. Kathleen Kenworthy, case no. 110905153 DC (Third
District Court, Salt Lake Cmmty, State of Utah) (2011 ).
1
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satisfaction, that he is still held for its liquidation and payment, is sufficient to revive the debt or
claim

Beck v. Dutchman Coal. Mines Co., 2 Utah2d 104,108,269 P.2d 867,869 (Utah 1954), quoting
Elder v. Dyer, 26 Kan 604, 610 (Kan 1881 ), (overruled on a separate issue by Bernard v.
Davidson, 112 Kan 31, 209 P. 668 (Kan 1922).
An "acknowledgment necessary to start the statute anew must be more than a hint, a reference,

or a discussion of an old debt; it nrust amount to a clear recognition of the claim and liability as presently
existing." Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. Shurtliff, 83 Utah 488, 30 P.2d 733, 737 (Utah 1934), quoting

In re Gilman, Son and Co., 57 F.2d 294,296 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
In the 2011 Counterclaim, Defendant admitted entering into the Original Agreement on April
24, 2006, but denied any outstanding debt obligation to Plaintiff Goldenwest v. Kenworthy, case no.
110905153 DC (Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah) (2011), Answer and
CoW1terclairn The 2011 C01.mterclaim presented no clear recognition of the debt owed to Plaintiff and
no corresponding liability. Because the 2011 Counterclaim does not admit liability on Plaintiff's claim,
Defendant's pleading is not an acknowledgment of the debt necessary to revive the statute of limitations
under§ 78B-2-l 13(1)(b).
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CONCLUSION

The applicable statute of limitations had nm prior to Plaintiff initiating the present action. The
actions of the Parties did not renew the statute of limitations necessary to protect Plaintiffs cause of
action and Plaintifrs claim is barred by§ 78B-2-l 13(2) and § 78B-2-309(2) (six year statute of
limitations). Defendant's Motion for Smmnary Judgment is hereby GRANTED ..
vJ

Dated this ~ a y o ~ 2014.
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ADDENDUM#2
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Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment)
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Timothy W. I3lackbum(0355)
AllorneJ,'S for Goldenwest Federal Credit Union
372 24 th Street. Suite 400
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (80 I) 394-5783
FAX: (801) 627-2522
Email: thlnckbunv\·1:vnnctlll .i.:0111
IN THE THIRD ,JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT STATE OF UTAH
GOLDENWEST FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION. a Utah corporation
Plaintiffs,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF SHANNA
HOWELL fN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Case No. l 49905786
Judge
Collections

KATHLEEN KENWORTHY

Defendants.
KATHLEEN KENWORTHY.

Counterclaim Plaintiff
VS.

GOLDENWEST FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION, a Corporation
Counterclaim Defendant

STATE OF UTAH

: ss
COUNTY OF WEBER
671 :97t70v
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SHANNA HOWELL, first being sworn, deposes and says:
l.

I am employed by Plaintiff, Goldenwest Federal Credit Union, in the

Collections Department.

2.

I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit.

3.

If I were called to testify, I could testify as to the facts contained in this

affidavit.
4.

In the Collection Notes attached as an exhibit to this affidavit, lam identified

as '·User 500". My notes regarding my interaction with Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff
Kathleen Kenworthy, are recorded on the Collection Notes as User 500.
S.

On May 8. 2009, Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Kathleen Kenworthy, made

a $200 payment over the telephone, using her VISA Card No. XXXXXXXXXXXX3346.
A copy of the receipt for said $200.00 payment made on May 8, 2009, is attached hereto,

marked as Exhibit '·A". Also attached is a copy of the Collection Notes entered on May 9,
2008, noting that Kathleen Kenworthy stated that she would call ''next month and do the
same•·. At that time, I informed her that her payments would stay due on the I 5th day of each
month.
6.

Defendant Kathleen Kenworthy's next payment was due June 15, 2009.

Kathleen Kenwo1thy did not make the June 15. 2009 payment.
7.

Defendant/ Counterclaim Plaintiff Kathleen Kenworthy called Plaintiff on

June l 0, 2008 and said Htowing place has now taken possession of her wrecked vehicle. I told
her it was wrecked and we didn't want it. She said she could have sold it, but we wouldn,t
• 2 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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release the title to her, so she said this is lender liability and she won't pay us and will get nn
attorney." Sec Collection Notes marked as Exhibit .;B'', attached, entry dated June 10, 2008.

SHANNA HOWELL

SUBSCRIBED AND SWOR.i'\J to before me by Shanna Howell, this)?.'.'--'-' day of
August, 2014.

,..._____IP'"______

,c

-

K~,~~~~'.~R;~:~:i~y~
j
# 052001
Comm1ss1on

cor.11,1 EXP. Ol-02-2016
4S27,.J217-l-l20,

V.

Digitized
671 :97l70vl

I

. l.

by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

BOLD£HIJ£St ·WJ

·14:7 26nl ST .·
i'.J~-t''l"il 111'7 Q,1,1•1
1'1:J.l;:1~1
U'f'l~L

.U'

I•

I·
GOLDEHUEST FCU
147 wrn ST
QuOEHr UT 84_4g1

B&? 475Bt81i1t!i 5g1
1~~0J! ~02 S5Z15lb~
65i~91~B ,lij:38

:\~~~:-lf'tl'i
f_~J ~iG .

~:·;c . t:;e~
•·11[
ti!jf:2 ~~l. :

.xxxx:i:~'f.'fiXtl334~

•

I

!.

tfeS:H

tJJSA
0~·tB~:5

.:no"v.

$

200 .. 00

L,

·.·..

r~:~tE

-m PAY AWiE

riHAL Ai'1uWH
T~ CflRti I~SIJHi fiGHW1£i'IT
~r~S;-i;;~;l :l:}R[u18{'. [F c~am !iOUCHER)

::,:..i~~1~U'.?}

EXHIBIT

I

A

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to give to jennifer for legal
07/07/2008 12:13p User 124

Loan 01

What is being done to collect on repo
def?
06/10/2008

3:43p User 500

Loan 01

cont --has agreed to ser.d ea mo to us
w.i.th cuna we can send them $100 ea mo
that will help with pmts to them also
--this was not what she w3nted to hear
was all our fault she cld have sold this
wrecked vehilcle for $4000 and pd on her
loan -she was mad and ended our
conversation
06/10/2008

3:40p User 500

Loan 01

kathleen called upset as towing place
has now taken poss of her wrecked
vehci le she wanted to kr.ow why we diclnt
t ld her because was wre•:ked and we diclnt
want it --sd she she cld of sold it but
we wouldnt release the title to her so
she sd this is lender liability and she
wont pay us will get an atty --i
explaind cuna insur pmt to her tld her
this in insurance on our loss not hers
and she is still liable for full amt of
loan --tld her we cld split the $200 she
05/10/2008 11:19p User904 Loan 01
Payment of 200.00 made on 05/09/08

toward a 487.21 payment due on
02/15/08. Loan delinquent for 85 days.
05/09/2008 11 :58a User 500

Loan 01

kathleen called back vmtac: to know if
she can now sell/dispose of vehicle as
still is tow yard --to help on bal owing
--i discussed this with jennifer sd now
that she has made arrangements on bal
she can dispose of this
05/09/2008 10:48a User 500

Loan 01

ran visa thru £or the $200 ---posted pmt
--mailed receipt
we can bring acct currant after 3 good
faith pmts
05/09/2008 10:13a User 500

Loan 01

i called kathleen --made pmt
arrangements for $200 mo on this repo
dif --best for now may be able to do
more later --she will be changing jobs
next month as her co is closing her dept
down - -will get back to me with new poe
info ----she wanted to make her 1st $200
pmt 2day with her visa --sd will call me
next m~·and do same --pmts will stay due
on the!lSth of:mo
05/09/2008 H:18p User 904

Loan 01

Payment of 17,549.60 made on 05/08/08
toward a 487.21 payment due on
02/15/08. Loan delinquent for 84 days.
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
(Pursuant to Rule 24{0(1)(C))

I hereby certify that Appellant's Brief is compliant with the type-volume
limitations of Rule 24, Utah Rules ofAppellate Procedure. Appellant's Brief contains
4,360 words.
Respectfully submitted this 8th day of Janu ry, 2016.
KNOWLES, P.C.

Attorney for Goldenwest Fed. Credit Union
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